ceived in a variety of ways (e.g. as knowledge, as a personal God, as the extinction of self, etc.). It is religious because it constitutes the ultimate concern of those who pursue it. 5 Pluralist theologies regard all religious traditions as more or less equally well placed regarding the possibility of knowledge of the religious object. This conviction is born of a more fundamental agreement about religious knowledge in general. Despite their manifest differences, 6 and despite Knitter's recent insistence that the pluralist theology of religions is "a project that is not yet complete and that has various proposed versions," 7 pluralist theologians are united in regarding all religious knowledge as evolutionary, culturally determined, pragmatic, and polar. This fourfold characterization of religious knowledge is discernible, to a greater or lesser degree, in all the major pluralist thinkers, though particular authors tend to concentrate specifically on one of these features. In this article, I will illustrate this claim by discussing several representative pluralist authors and by referring also to parallel lines of thought in others. What results is a sketch of what I call the emerging pluralist epistemology. As Wilfred Cantwell Smith acknowledges, the task of developing a pluralist epistemology is interlinked with, not prior to the task of attaining the universalist vision to which pluralist theology aspires. PLURALIST THEOLOGY OF RELIGIONS 689 temological vision rests on four pillars that might be summarized as becoming, relatedness, reciprocity, and unity in diversity. First, all that is is involved in a dynamic process of self-realization. Second, this process of self-realization is achieved in and through a complex network of interrelationships. Third, interrelatedness involves a profound exchange among the participants, "an ever more pervasive concentration of the many in each other and thus in a greater whole." 10 Fourth, the object of this process of interrelational becoming is a complex unity-a unitive pluralism-that, however, does not detract from the distinctiveness of its component parts. This unitive pluralism stands in stark contrast to absolute or monistic oneness where difference is overcome. Unitive pluralism gives "manyness" ontological priority.
11
The four structural elements of Knitter's processive-relational view of reality reappear in his analysis of the contemporary religious situation. He argues that the world's religious traditions are being drawn by the creative lure within all reality toward a new sort of encounter with one another. The goal of this encounter is a more pervasive unity among the world's religions within which each, while retaining its unique character, develops and takes on new depths.
12
The implication of this essentially teleological vision is that religious knowledge, on the one hand, is always provisional, and, on the other hand, is only provisionally complete when it represents the shared insights of all those engaged with religion's object. An adequate description of such knowledge has been proffered by Wilfred Cantwell Smith and is endorsed by Knitter. According to Smith, "true knowledge, in human affairs, is that knowledge that all intelligent men and women .. . can share, and can jointly verify, by observation and by participation." 13 This knowledge comes to expression in a corporate or global self-consciousness. To share this transcultural consciousness is to share a religious world citizenship or a postconventional and universalistic religious identity that, for Knitter, is synonymous with unitive pluralism.
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
The most obvious means to this end is the practice of dialogue between religious men and women. Hence, Knitter endorses John Dunne's call for believers from distinct traditions to pass over to the traditions of others, that is, to immerse themselves in the ethos and practices of other faiths with a view to experiencing first-hand something of the dynamic that characterizes the religious life of those others. 15 Knitter recognizes that the achievement of this double belonging is reserved for a minority, but it is a prerequisite if interreligious dialogue is to bear fruit. 16 The acknowledgment that double belonging is only a possibility for some, taken together with Smith's description of knowledge, including religious knowledge, as the consensus among intelligent men and women, is somewhat unsettling. At the very least, it is rather striking that a system such as pluralism, which eschews all exclusivism, should manifest such elitist tendencies. We shall return to this theme.
We have already indicated that Knitter is indebted to the thought of Wilfred Cantwell Smith, the reputed father of pluralism. One of the central tenets of Smith's thought is the essential unity of humankind's religious history. What has hitherto appeared, even to the historian, as, so to speak, a collection of unrelated stories, has been shown in our day to be a complex whole. 17 What is taking place in Christianity is also taking place in other religious traditions, namely, the process of "God's loving, creative, inspiring dealings with recalcitrant and sinful but not unresponsive men and women." The upshot of this is that any adequate portrayal of "the objective pole in religious experience," the "reality greater than man [ 28 And what has been going on is the process of continuous creation in which "the transcendent, indeed infinite, truth CGod'), beyond history and continuingly contemporaneous" with it, has been engaging religious men and women. Hence, Smith can write that "all human history is a divinehuman complex in motion, the process of humankind's double involvement in a mundane and simultaneously a transcendent environment." 28 Smith, Towards a World Theology 128. Knitter remarks that "to experience and speak about salvation as revelation represents a valid, more ecumenical soteriology than the more prevalent salvation-as-historical-transaction perspective" ("Can Our One and Only* Also Be a One among Many*?" 156-57). However, he immediately insists that Christ's role in this regard, i.e. as revealer, ought to be conceived in a representational and not in a constitutive fashion: "Jesus brings about salvation ... not by constituting or causing God's saving love, but, rather, insofar as he re-presents for us the re-creative love of God that is inherent in the divine nature and is poured out on all creation." Knitter repeats the view that Jesus' story essentially only serves to illustrate "the larger, cosmic story of how the divine is already present and communicating itself to all cre ation" (ibid. 167).
29 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "Theology and the World's Religious History," in Toward a Universal Theology of Religion, 67, 59; see also 68. 30 See Chester Gillis's observation that pluralist theology "does not begin with scrip-second feature of pluralist epistemology, the view that religious knowledge is culturally determined.
CULTURALLY DETERMINED CHARACTER OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE
The pluraliste' attachment to contemporaneity appears to be the consequence of a tendency to make present religious experience the touchstone of religious knowledge. 31 This feature of pluralism, in turn, is almost certainly a portion of the inheritance of liberal Protestantism and more particularly of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834).
32
Schleiermacher's response to the rationalist and reductionist interpretations of religion that were characteristic of the Enlightenment was to root religion in the recesses of human consciousness. His aim was to defend faith by grounding it in "the immediate feeling of the Infinite and Eternal.
By feeling, Schleiermacher did not mean mere emotion. Feeling for him was a profound sense or consciousness of the self as caught up in a mystery of a greater whole, a mystery called God. Schleiermacher equated "the consciousness of absolute dependence" with "being in relation with God"; 35 he insisted that religion was not knowledge; 36 in his system, the ultimate authority remains religious experience as such. This experience and its source were regarded as ineffable, essentially impervious to adequate description. Historical consciousness, which warns us that all human knowledge is limited, has a flip-side in religious consciousness, which admonishes us that Divine Reality is unlimited. In other words, if historical consciousness tells us that every human grasp of truth is intrinsically finite and conditioned, religious consciousness-the fruit of religious experience-tells us even more assuredly that Divine Reality and Truth is, by its very nature, always more than any human can grasp or any religion can express. This realization is inherent in any authentic religious experience-the paradoxical sense that my particular, historical encounter with God is as mysterious as it is real, as ambiguous as it is reliable.
40
James L. Fredericks has claimed that Schleiermacher's insistence on the resistance of the religious experience to final description ultimately renders public inquiry into the nature of religious phenomena impossible. The religiously ungifted are simply not able to participate in the discussion. Hence, discourse about religion is effectively privatized.
41
More insidiously, one might argue, religious discourse is left to the insiders, to those intelligent men and women who "can share, and can jointly verify, by observation and by participation."
42
In addition to its apologetic function, the argument from religious experience has also served later theologians as a heuristic device in confrontation with the plurality of religions. This has been achieved by supplementing the claim regarding the ineffability of religious experi- 40 Knitter, Jesus and the Other Names 37. Knitter returns to this theme and suggests that any claim to an unsurpassable revelation in Jesus is "in tension, if not direct contradiction, with the more basic Christian belief that God is an unsurpassable Mystery, one which can never totally be comprehended or contained in human thought or construct" ("Five Theses on the Uniqueness of Jesus," in The Uniqueness of Jesus 8). Here and elsewhere, Knitter appears to confuse the Christian claim that the Christevent is God's definitive revelation with the view (which is not part of orthodox Christianity) that the fullness of divinity has been exhaustively expressed in the Incarnation (ibid. 8 n. 10). To claim that Jesus is God's definitive revelation on this side of history, so to speak, is not to deny that God remains mysterious. 46 Of course, that experience is always shaped by its cultural and religious context. There is no such thing as pure religious experience and pluralists rightly reject the charge that they regard particular religious traditions as, so to speak, accessories after the religious fact. Concrete religious traditions provide the forum within which religious experience becomes possible, and the categories that allow believers both to express that experience and to name its source or ground. 46 Nevertheless, as heirs of Schleiermacher, the pluralists insist that the grounding religious experience is ineffable and that doctrines can never do it justice. This Schleiermachkrian inheritance is reflected in the pluralists' tendency to highlight the distinction between faith and beliefs. While among these pluralists Smith is the most prominent advocate of this distinction, 47 it is a consistent feature of pluralist theology.
So Hick can write that the world's great religious traditions (Smith's "beliefs") "embody different perceptions and conceptions of, and correspondingly different responses to, the Real or the Ultimate, from within the different cultural ways of being human." 48 He insists that "Christianity is one among a plurality of authentic responses to the 43 Fredericks, "A Universal Religious Experience" 72-73. 44 Ibid. 73. Note the parallel between Smith's observation that "the truth that one seeks [is] to be found not in the history of religion but through it" (Towards a World Theology 190) and Schleiermacher's claim that "I would have you discover religion in the religions" (On Religion 211). 45 See, e.g., Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 14; Metaphor of God Incarnate 38-39; The Rainbow of Faiths (London: SCM, 1995). Knitter observes that pluralists "would grow uneasy" with George Lindbeck's rejection of the so-called "experiential-expressive notion of religion, which holds that we first have an inner experience of, or an 'inner word' from Divinity, which we then display in our religious beliefs and practices" (Jesus and the Other Names 42).
46 Knitter speaks about religious experience "iUuminating the language" of religion at the same time that "the language is forming the experience" (One Earth, Many Religions 115). 47 
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Knitter, much like Hick, locates the origins of religion in "a powerful revelatory event or events" that involved "an intuitive contact with, the grasping and being grasped by, the ultimate." 51 He also describes the ultimate as the unspeakable reality, the "divine mystery ever beyond our comprehension," and "the ineffable content behind all authentic religion." 52 Taking his cue also from Smith, Knitter describes the encounter with the ultimate as "faith," 53 which he distinguishes from the historically conditioned and manifestly diverse beliefs of the world's religions. He contends that while each religion certainly originates in a powerful revelatory event, the identity of each religion is not given in such events. Instead it is given in the process of history, of which these events form a mere part. A religion's identity is not given in the original event of revelation/religious experience, but emerges from the at- 55 Hence, while beliefs are essential to faith, since faith must come to expression, they have no absolute value. We must be ever ready, he argues, to revise and move beyond them. Our willingness to die for our faith must be matched by a willingness to die to our beliefs. This becomes possible once we recognize that faith experience is a universal reality-and hence presumably permanent-while beliefs, i.e. particular religious and creedal traditions, are contextual and subject to the permutations of history. Although Knitter says that the relationship between faith and beliefs is dynamic and in flux, it would seem that the flux lies only on the side of beliefs. Knitter's shift does not seem to vitiate in any way his commitment to the principle that religious knowledge is culturally determined. Likewise, it does not represent a real departure from the tenet of the pluralists that all religions are grounded in a universally accessible religious experience. What has changed is simply the locus for the manifestation of the religious object, i.e. the object that inspires culturally determined ritual actions and doctrinal systems. This object was previously disclosed in the recesses of religious consciousness but is now disclosed in the political consciousness shaped by the "common commitment to human and ecological well-being."
59 What I judge to be a turn in Knitter's thinking is completely in keeping with the third feature of the pluralist vision of religious knowledge, namely, its pragmatic character.
PRAGMATIC CHARACTER OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE
Pluralist theology as a whole is characterized by an essentially pragmatic view of religious knowledge. By this I mean that praxis is portrayed as providing the only reliable access to religious knowledge and that claims to such knowledge are to be adjudicated on the basis of their promotion of human well-being (a synonym for salvation). Pluralist theologians are well aware that the notion of human well-being or wholeness 60 constitutes only a formal principle for interreligious dialogue and that the world's religious traditions are divided regarding the precise content of this notion. A number of pluralist thinkers have analyzed both the potential and pitfalls inherent in proposing human well-being as the goal of interreligious dialogue and using it as the criterion for assessing religious truth claims. The most intractable element of this discussion is clearly the difficulty of arriving at any universally acceptable definition of the human. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to canvass the various definitions of wholeness or salvation developed by particular pluralists, I can illustrate the pluralists' tendency to portray practical engagement in the world as the only reliable path to religious knowledge. Once again, Knitter may serve as a point of departure. While Knitter would insist that one is not forced to choose between mystical or religious experience and liberative commitment, it is clear from his most recent writings that he considers the commitment to what he now calls eco-human well-being 62 as both the source of religion and the gateway to mystical experience. He apparently accepts the view that all religions take their origins from some kind of a primordial liberative experience, such as, e.g., the Jewish experience of the Exodus, Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom of God, the Meccan experience, or Buddha's leaving the palace for a life of homelessness. These experiences testify to a common source that manifests itself as an energy of liberation. Knitter repeats Aloysius Pieris's claim that this source can be identified symbolically as a liberating Spirit, described differently in the world's religious traditions. 63 In the course of the liberative struggle, the religious person posits the Sacred or the Transcendent or wholeness as the ground (for both nontheists and theists) and perhaps even the goal (for theists) of the liberative process.
Despite his protestations that he recognizes a genuine reciprocity between the mystical and the prophetic, or the liturgical and the ethical, Knitter clearly accords priority to the latter when religious truth is at issue:
From the perspective of how this world came to be and how it is sustained, we will give worship or ritual a priority in religious life, for in liturgy we recognize the priority of the Divine over the finite. But from the perspective of how we come to know the Divine, we will give the priority to ethics, for it is in the struggle for "right living" that we come to know and feel what we are to worship and confess. Again, orthopraxis (right acting) has a practical priority over orthodoxy (right confessing).
64
In language strongly reminiscent of the experiential thrust of Schleiermacher and Uberai Protestantism, Knitter repeatedly insists that this ground or goal is felt, not known. 65 He insists that study, prayer, and ritual sharing can only be truly effective as means to greater sharing among religions when they are mixed with the praxis of global responsibility. Global responsibility serves as a shared context for religious experience, or a source of shared experiences by which believers from different communities can better understand and com- inimicate each others' religious stories and language. 66 For him "common ethical struggles can lead us to shared manifestations of a Power or Sacred Mystery that animates our global responsibility." 67 Access to religious truth, even as this comes to expression in different religious traditions, is the fruit of practical engagement in the world. As Knitter expresses it, Truth, especially truth that really matters to us, is always practical; it is tied together with our struggle to live our lives, to figure out how we want to live and why.... If this is so about the general way we search for and come to affirm what is true about life, it is also and especially so about the way we come to know the truth about the Sacred or the Great Mystery. Religious experience, one can say, is born in and nourished by moral experience. 68 Working together for justice becomes, or can become, a communicatio in sacris-a communication in the Sacred-available to us beyond our churches and temples.
69
Knitter expresses a pragmatic conception of truth when he describes the kind of consensus that will emerge out of the shared commitment to the removal of human and ecological suffering. The upshot of this cooperative commitment will not be a single truth that we can all finally come to or a universal foundation on which we can all build a new world order. Nor will it be a propositional statement that we will all affirm. Instead, it will be a way of being together that aims at the well-being of all the world. Knitter approvingly quotes David Krieger to the effect that true in this sense is less something we know than something we do. Truth is what promotes cosmotheandric solidarity, that is to say, the solidarity that "links cosmos, humanity, and divinity in a mutuality and interconnectedness in which we are all responsible for each other's well-being." 70 Such solidarity "realizes itself concretely in non-violent praxis, not in any particular ideological, political, or economic system/'
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In the case of Krieger, as in the case of other pluralist theologians, the determination to put praxis at the center of the interreligious agenda is as much a necessity as a virtue. In the postmodern context, where universalistic pretensions have collapsed, the only sort of foundationalism that can be tolerated is a foundational praxis, that is to say, "a non-violent praxis that establishes a cosmotheandric solidar- ity."
72 Krieger, together with Knitter, Gilkey, and others, portray praxis primarily in terms of sociopolitical engagement. While the overtly political dimension is less evident in other pluralist thinkers, such as Hick and Smith, they also highlight the ethical dimensions of religious faith. 73 Religion for them concerns those values that further human well-being. For all of them, the pursuit of the values enjoined by religion is the way to knowledge of the religious object. It is no exaggeration to say with Krieger that pluralist theology accords epistemologica! priority to praxis. 74 For Gilkey, "the structure of praxis is our most helpful clue to the structure of being." 75 Gilkey explains that, in the effort to give one's religious commitment concrete form, especially in the confrontation with demonic systems, the believer's relative and historically limited faith perspective is necessarily absolutized. The demand to act or to engage in a particular praxis brings with it a forced option, one that cannot be avoided. This is the great paradox of the pluraliste' understanding of praxis, the fact that it implies a juxtaposition or synthesis of the relative and the absolute that is frustrating intellectually and yet necessary practically. a pluralistic world. They must be understood to be relative manifestations of the Absolute. As relative, they must point beyond themselves to the ever-greater Absolute. They must negate and transcend themselves; they are final and yet not the only one.
77
Gilkey extends the insight garnered from engagement in the world to the new interrelationships of religions to one another. Here, too, praxis, now in the form of dialogue between diverse positions, pushes and lures us into the middle of a maze we still can hardly enter intellectually. Just as we do in creative political action, so now in doing dialogue we embody and enact the pluralist paradox of relative absoluteness. 78 The theological divisions remain, but in and through the praxis of dialogue they are seen for what they are, subordinated to the real cause that religion serves.
Among pluralist thinkers, Hick has insisted with most force on the necessity of relativizing religious truth claims in view of the real goal of humanity's religious project. He describes that goal as "human transformation from natural self-centeredness to a new centering in the Real, the Ultimate."
79 The actual differences among the world's religious traditions, whether these concern questions of history, metaphysics, or doctrine, 80 are only penultimately important for the realization of this goal. Hence they ought to be de-emphasized in the interreligious encounter. What counts is the process of transformation from "self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness," 81 a transformation that "is most readily observed by its moral limits, which can be iden- Gavin D'Costa has pointed out that it is a characteristic plea of pluralist theologians "that truth-claims should and can be harmonized by means of a both-and, rather than an either-or, model." 87 This is certainly the case, although in my judgment it is possible to distinguish at least three distinct tendencies regarding the pluralist justification of such harmonization. The first tendency, represented by Knitter, consists in the claim that transcendent reality, in all its mysterious complexity, is best described by recourse to multiple descriptions, a version of the classical doctrine of the coincidentia oppositorum. The second tendency, represented by Hick, consists in the claim that transcendent reality is beyond all description, though rival offerings are inevitable given the culturally determined character of all thought and experience. The third and most radical tendency, represented by Raimundo Panikkar, consists in the claim that Truth or Being is itself essentially plural or even that the religious object is ultimately unknowable, a sort of docta ignorantia. 88 All these tendencies share a conviction that transcendent reality, called God by Christians, ultimately remains shrouded in mystery. What distinguishes these tendencies is the degree of agnosticism each professes in regard to that mystery. 89 Knitter's proposal, though lacking the philosophical sophistication of Hick's proposal, appears to me the most characteristic of pluralist theology. As I have noted, Knitter insists that competing descriptions of the religious object are essentially complementary. This view, evident in No Other Name? (1985), is equally evident in One Earth Many Religions (1995). 90 The earlier work contains an intriguing passage that might be read as a critique of Hick's agnostic view of the legitimacy of rival religious truth claims:
The world religions, in all their amazing differences, are more complementary than contradictory. What this complementarity implies extends beyond the imagination of most Westerners. The import of the new model of relational truth goes beyond the recognition that the view of the Absolute enshrined in each religion is limited, beyond the admission that each religion is a map of the territory but not the territory itself. In asserting that the maps are really different and that these differences are necessary in order to know the terri tory, the new model of truth implies that all religious experience and all reli gious forms are by their very nature dipolar."
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Hick's position may be understood as consisting in the claim that "each religion is a map of the territory but not the territory itself. " But what Knitter is here advocating is certainly not a mere willingness to live with rival claims. Instead, it seems to consist in a recommendation to embrace positively, even to delight in the tension that such rivalry involves. The tensions or polarities, as Knitter prefers to say, are dia logical and creative. Hence, Knitter refers approvingly to the Taoist principle of yin and yang which sees ultimate reality as composed of a dynamic coincidence of opposites. According to Knitter, that reality is dipolar is evident in our experience, especially our religious experi ence. As we discover the personality of God, we realize that God is beyond personality. As we awaken to the "already" of God's kingdom in this world, we become ever more conscious of its "not-yet." The fact of the dipolar character of our religious experience has real implications for attempts to articulate religious truth. As Knitter expresses it, all religious experience must be dipolar, a union of opposites. Accordingly, "every discovery, every insight, must be balanced by its opposite," and "every belief, every doctrinal claim, must... be clarified and corrected by beliefs that, at first sight, claim the contrary."
92

CONCLUSION
As indicated at the outset, the four features of the conception of religious knowledge I have described are elements of an emergent pluralist epistemology, although each element in this fourfold group ing has its own particular antecedents. Moreover, not every element is equally well represented in the thought of particular pluralist authors. Given the variegated themes addressed by pluralist theologians, this is not surprising. Nevertheless, these four elements are present to a greater or lesser degree in the writings of all those theologians defend ing the pluralist paradigm.
Within the space of a single article, it is not possible to engage in a 91 Knitter, No Other Name? 220. 92 Ibid. 221. See also "Five Theses on the Uniqueness of Jesus" 10 n. 14,13 n. 19; "Can Our One and ΟτΑγ Also Be a 'One among Many?" 152. critical dialogue with pluralist thought. However, the view of religious knowledge as evolutionary, culturally determined, pragmatic, and po lar is not without significance for a religious tradition that locates the heart of saving revelation in a past event, that ascribes a universal significance to this event, that regards the content of this event as, at least in part, a doctrine concerning God's very self, and that insists that truth is one. 93 Indeed, in my judgment, the pluralists' understand ing of religious knowledge cannot be ultimately integrated into any recognizable version of orthodox Christianity. I do not deny that plu ralist thought highlights themes that need desperately to be ad dressed, nor do I wish to gainsay insights into the Christian and nonChristian traditions that emerge from their reflection. Nor do I impugn the sincerity and religious conviction of pluralist thinkers.
Still, it is not clear to me how pluralist authors hope to sustain the constant Christian tradition of narrative, praxis, and worship on the basis of those principles that constitute the bedrock of their thought. Among those essential elements of traditional Christianity that pluralism seems to preclude, I would highlight the following three (though this listing is by no means exhaustive): the very possi bility, let alone the reality, of a distinctive historical revelation, the understanding of faith as what Newman described as certitude, namely, the firm and reasonable conviction that the object of our faith is knowable and known, and worthy of absolute commitment; 95 
